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Essay

The Economists' New Arguments
Brett H. McDonnellt
Adam and Max, two law professors and longtime friends, have
just run into each other at an Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) meeting. Adam has long been a zealous partisan of the law and economics approach to legal analysis. Max,
though he has some training in economics, is more skeptical
about that approach. The two old friends have discussed various aspects of this subject over the years, and in this meeting
they renew their discussion. The topic this time: Fairness
Versus Welfare,' the new book (formerly a mammoth article in
the Harvard Law Review) 2 by two leadingadvocates of law and
economics, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.
ADAM: Max, my old friend, how are you? Have you read
the great new book by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell?
MAX:
I am just fine, Adam. In response to your question,
I have indeed read a new book by Kaplow and Shavell. I assume we are both talking about FairnessVersus Welfare? As to
whether or not it is a great new book, I reserve judgment on
that point. Perhaps you can convince me otherwise, but I don't
see why it has gotten so much attention.
ADAM: I'm surprised at you, Max. After all, Kaplow and
Shavell have come up with a powerful and explosive new argument for why all scholars engaged in a normative analysis of
t Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank
Brian Bix, Daniel Farber, David McGowan, and Paul Rubin for helpful comments.
1.

LOUIS KAPLOW &

STEVEN SHAVELL,

FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE

(2002) [hereinafter FAIRNESS].
2. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 961 (2001). Before that, it was a short piece in another journal. Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of Fairness and the
ParetoPrinciple, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999). References in the following
are to the book version.
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the law should restrict themselves to doing welfare economics.'
They show that any argument that is not based on welfare economics, that is, any argument that does not focus on a policy's
net effect on the welfare of individuals, is illegitimate.4 I can
understand how an old law and economics skeptic such as
yourself may refuse to be won over by this argument, although
I suspect that's just a case of an old dog refusing to learn new
tricks. But what I don't understand is how you can fail to see
why scholars are bound to pay attention to Kaplow and Shavell's argument. After all, most legal scholars spend much of
their time doing normative analysis that is very often grounded
in non-welfare analysis. FairnessVersus Welfare suggests that
such time is wasted and potentially pernicious. Surely such an
argument deserves serious attention, right?
MAX:
I read the book carefully but came away from it
quite puzzled. Kaplow and Shavell do, on many, many occasions, say they have made an argument in favor of the position
you just described. In all Fairness,however, I failed to find any
actual argument in favor of welfare economics over alternative
approaches. There are a few cogent criticisms of some particular non-welfare arguments-or, using their term for all nonwelfare-based approaches, "fairness" arguments'-but I found
no general argument whatsoever for accepting welfarism and
rejecting fairness.
ADAM: What do you mean, no general argument? How can
you miss it-they make it over and over again?6 To understand
them, you must remember that by "fairness" Kaplow and Shavell mean, as you just noted, approaches that choose between alternative social outcomes based partly on criteria other than
impact on the welfare of individuals.7 Thus, both Kantian deontological ethics and many versions of libertarian liberalism,
such as that of Robert Nozick, are fairness theories in their
terminology.
MAX:
I must note at the outset that what you and Kap-

3. FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See id. at 3-4.
5. In Kaplow and Shavell's terminology, "fairness" theories include any
which are not completely grounded in the effects of policy on human welfare.
Mixed theories that give some but not total weight to welfare effects are thus
fairness theories. Id. at 5-6.
6. See, e.g., id. at 7-8, 52-54, 104-05, 185-86, 189, 236-38, 259, 320-22,
465-66. No guarantees that this list is exhaustive.
7. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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low and Shavell mean by the "welfare" of individuals is a big
question. Much ink has been shed over the definition of "welfare." Amartya Sen's prodigious career, for instance, has been
dedicated in large part to trying to understand that term. 8
ADAM: Kaplow and Shavell basically follow modern welfare economics in defining welfare with respect to individuals'
preferred states of affairs-a person's welfare increases if she
moves to a state that she prefers to her prior positionalthough they grant that sometimes one may want to define
welfare in terms of what individuals would prefer given full information about the state of affairs. 9
MAX:
That informational provision right there opens up
a big can of worms. Anyway, go on for now. Perhaps later we
will talk a bit more about their concept of welfare.1"
ADAM: Given their definition of fairness, Kaplow and
Shavell argue that any fairness theory must in some possible
circumstances prefer a policy that makes everyone worse off
than some other alternative policy. 1 That is, all fairness theories must violate a weak version of the Pareto criterion. 12 Their
general proof of this is simple and obvious where everyone is
symmetrically situated. The argument is more complicated in
the asymmetric case, and indeed Kaplow and Shavell make
13
that argument in a separate article rather than in the book.
In the book, they apply the argument in symmetrical cases to a
number of more particular settings, such as contracts, torts,
civil procedure, and criminal law. 4

8. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT (The
MIT Press 1982) (1982); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (7

Professor Dr. P. Hennipman Lectures in Econ., 1985) [hereinafter SEN,
COMMODITIES].
9. FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 18, 410-13.
10. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
11. FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 8 & n.14.
12. See id. at 54 n.76. Under such a weak version of the Pareto criterion,
outcome A is preferred to outcome B if all persons are better off under outcome
A than outcome B. Under a strong version of the Pareto criterion, outcome A is
preferred to outcome B if at least one person is better off under A than under
B and no one is worse off. See Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social
Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 176
(2000) (discussing the Pareto principle in relation to an individual's preference
rather than becoming better off).
13. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the ParetoPrinciple, 109 J. POL. ECON. 281 (2001).
14. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 104-05, 185-86, 189, 236-38, 259,
320-21.

20031

THE ECONOMISTS'NEW ARGUMENTS

89

I won't repeat the proof to you, but the basic idea is simple
and in retrospect pretty obvious, especially in the symmetric
case, where everyone has the same preference over alternative
outcomes. By definition, fairness theories do not always follow
welfarism. Consider a case where fairness conflicts with welfare. If welfare is reduced, then it must be that each person is
worse off, since everyone has the same preferences over the
outcomes. And so the outcome preferred by fairness is Pareto
inefficient. Thus, anyone who advocates any fairness theory is
committed to making everyone worse off in some circumstances. Since making everyone worse off is obviously objectionable, fairness approaches are untenable. The proof is more
involved for the nonsymmetric case, and more creative, but
they manage to apply their argument to that case also.
MAX:
I agree that fairness, so defined, must conflict with
Pareto efficiency on some occasions. Or, I largely agree. In the
nonsymmetric case, the argument requires a few auxiliary assumptions. In particular, fairness theories must be continuous
in the sense that fairness does not act merely as a tiebreaker in
cases where the Pareto criterion does not rank two alternatives.15 Let me grant that assumption. Still, it is one thing to
say that welfare and fairness approaches must sometimes conflict, but it is quite another thing to argue that because conflict
is inevitable we should only follow a welfarist approach. One
must have some way of moving from the fact of conflict to a
conclusion that one approach is superior.
Kaplow and Shavell give us no way to make that move.
They simply assume that violating the Pareto criterion is obviously objectionable, and so we must reject any approach that
does.1 6 But, as you just noted, Pareto efficiency is a welfarist
criterion-indeed, when you get right down to it, Pareto efficiency is pretty much the welfarist criterion. 17 Kaplow and
15. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 13, at 284. Professor Chang and
Kaplow and Shavell discuss this assumption in a recent volume of the Yale
Law Journal. See Chang, supra note 12, at 223-24 (criticizing Kaplow and
Shavell's use of the assumption that fairness theories must be continuous);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of FairnessVersus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237, 242-47 (2000) (rebutting Chang's argument); see also Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a
Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) (replying to Kaplow and Shavell's

rebuttal).
16. See

FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 56 (arguing that Pareto compliance has
significance when determining appropriate criteria for making policy choices).
17. See discussion supra p. 89.
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Shavell only require that social welfare functions depend on individuals' well-being and that they be increasing functions of
individuals' well-being." One cannot rely on welfarism's key
principle to show that non-welfarism is objectionable-that is
simply circular and question begging. Yet that is precisely what
Kaplow and Shavell do. Why are non-welfarist approaches objectionable? we ask them. Because they sometimes decrease
welfare, they answer. That answer is persuasive only to someone who already accepts welfarism. Indeed, Kaplow and Shavell themselves point out that their argument is tautological. 19
As I understand the term "argument," this is no argument at
all. We are perilously close to Monty Python territory here.2 °
ADAM: I think that simply bringing out the conflict between fairness and welfare is much more powerful than you
admit. After all, any argument must eventually reach a point
where no further reasoning is possible; one simply accepts or
rejects the underlying premises. The Pareto criterion is compelling because of its minimalism. Who could say no to making
everyone better off? Who could advocate making everyone worse
off? Until now, fairness advocates have, through muddled
thinking, managed to avoid the conflict between this simple,
obvious criterion and their preferred approaches. When confronted with the conflict, they will have a hard time defending
their positions.2"
MAX: You are right that in the end any argument
18.

FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 24.

19. Id. at 7, 58.
20. For example:
MAN: Well, an argument's not the same as contradiction.
MR. VIBRATING: It can be.
MAN: No it can't. An argument is a connected series of statements to
establish a definite proposition.
MR. VIBRATING: No it isn't.
MAN: Yes it is. It isn't just contradiction.
MR. VIBRATING: Look, if I argue with you I must take up a contrary
position.
MAN: But it isn't just saying "No it isn't."
MR. VIBRATING: Yes it is.
GRAHAM CHAPMAN ET AL., 2 THE COMPLETE MONTY PYTHON'S FLYING CIRCUS:
ALL THE WORDS 87-88 (1989).
Other critics have noted how unsatisfying this tautology is. See Jules L.
Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1523-24 (2003); David
Dolinko, The Perils of Welfare Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 351, 363-64
(2002); Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness:A Reply to Kaplow
and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 857-61 (2002).
21. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 58.
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reaches a point where further reasoning adds nothing. The
question is, How far has a particular argument taken you from
its unreasoned premises to its conclusions? My point is that in
their core argument, Kaplow and Shavell really have taken us
nowhere at all. The core unargued premise of their argument is
that Pareto efficiency is obviously right and must prevail over
22 Their conclusion is that
any conflicting
welfarism is
bettrfirnes
thnprinciple. •23
better than fairness theories. Yet Pareto efficiency is the core
defining feature of welfarism.2 ' Arguing from Pareto efficiency
as a premise to welfarism as a conclusion just isn't very imaginative, interesting, or illuminating.
Let's put it this way: Do you expect fairness theorists to
simply throw up their hands and concede when confronted with
this book? I can see it now: Ronald Dworkin coming out and
admitting, "Gee, I guess I've just been completely wrong all
these years." It's not going to happen. Fairness theorists are
quite committed to intuitions favoring fairness over efficiency
when in conflict, and they are quite unlikely to abandon them
when confronted with Kaplow and Shavell's so-called "argument." If anyone denies the simple obvious attraction of
Pareto,25 Kaplow and Shavell have nothing left to throw at
them.
ADAM: Sure, confirmed fairness theorists aren't going to
just give up. But younger and less-committed scholars should
be persuaded by this book.
MAX:
Not if they are the least bit clearheaded and aren't
already strongly inclined toward welfarism.
Indeed, the conflict between fairness and welfare can be
used to argue in favor of fairness over welfare. Kaplow and
Shavell's "argument" demonstrates the obvious: Sometimes
fairness criteria and the Pareto criterion conflict-that is,
sometimes fairness criteria lead to inefficiency; likewise, the
Pareto criterion sometimes leads to unfairness.26 Furthermore,
all welfarist approaches must accept the Pareto criterion. 2 7
Therefore, the Kaplow and Shavell theorem can be restated as
showing that any welfarist approach, or any social welfare
22. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
25. As some do. See Daniel A. Farber, The Problematics of the Pareto
Principle 1-3, 37-38 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
26. See discussion supra p. 89.
27. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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function, must in some circumstances lead to an outcome that
is unfair. If one is committed to fairness, then one must reject
welfarism. This mirror image of Kaplow and Shavell's reasoning is every bit as logically valid.
In the past, the conflict between welfarism and fairness
has been used precisely in this way. A leading example is
Amartya Sen's famous article on the impossibility of a Paretian
liberal.28 Sen showed that on a particular interpretation of liberty as requiring that persons have the right to make certain
decisions affecting themselves, Pareto efficiency must in some
circumstances conflict with liberty.2 9 In a sense, Kaplow and
Shavell have merely reworked Sen's theorem. 0 Sen used his
theorem, however, to argue that Pareto efficiency is problematic. 3' After all, one of the core intuitions supporting Pareto efficiency is a notion of self-determination-surely everyone
32
would agree to an alternative that makes everyone better off.

Sen's demonstration that liberty and Pareto efficiency conflict
calls that intuition into question.
ADAM: Kaplow and Shavell recognize that move on Sen's
part. They say that Sen's definition of liberty is problematic because it rules out certain kinds of welfare-improving bargains
between persons. 33
MAX:
It's quite normal for theories of liberty to rule out
some kinds of bargains. For instance, contracts to put oneself
into slavery are prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.3 4
Daniel Farber also anticipated the Kaplow and Shavell
theorem. He argued that environmental principles and Pareto
efficiency may conflict, but nonetheless, environmental principles should sometimes prevail even if they are Pareto inefficient. If one uses environmental principles to decide between
two alternative states of affairs that are equally Pareto efficient, then consistency commits one to preferring environmentally better outcomes that are just slightly inefficient in some
28. Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL.
ECON. 152 (1970).
29. Id. at 157.
30. As Kaplow and Shavell themselves recognize. See FAIRNESS, supra
note 1, at 54 n.75.
31. See id. ("Sen interprets the conflict he adduces as raising questions
about the underlying appeal of the Pareto principle.").
32. As Kaplow and Shavell put it, if one insists upon fairness even where
it violates the Pareto principle, "To whom is one being fair?" Id. at 54.
33. See id.
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.

2003]

THE ECONOMISTS'NEW ARGUMENTS

93

cases. Like Sen, Farber took this as an argument against
Pareto, not environmentalism.3 5
Michael Dorff has argued that Kant took a similar stance
against utilitarianism. Although in most instances utilitarianism seeks to safeguard individual rights, the philosophy is
flawed because it will not always do so.36 Where utilitarianism
conflicts with rights, Kant said that rights must triumph
because the paramount value is individual autonomy.3 7 Only
autonomous individuals can choose the conception of good that
they wish to pursue. 38
Thus, even though Kaplow and Shavell are right that welfare and fairness must sometimes conflict, we can go either way
from there. Those already inclined to welfarist approaches will
conclude that we should reject fairness. Likewise, those
inclined to fairness approaches will conclude that we should
reject welfare. We need more to avoid a stalemate. Kaplow and
Shavell give us no more.
ADAM: Kaplow and Shavell make a strong point, though:
The Pareto inefficiency of fairness in the symmetric case39
should be quite troubling to many fairness advocates. ° After
all, the symmetric case is quite similar to the Rawlsian original
position, a thought device whereby, in deciding how to structure basic political institutions, the decision makers are placed
in a position where they are unaware of the place they will occupy in the resulting society.4' Surely those decision makers
would choose rules that make them better off rather than worse
off, right? Then, in light of Kaplow and Shavell, aren't they
committed to a welfare economics approach?
MAX:
I agree that this is where they come closest to
making an actual argument in favor of their position. Close, but
no cigar. First, not all fairness advocates follow the Rawlsian
35. See Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REV. 337, 346 n.22.
36. See Dorff, supra note 20, at 860.
37. See id. (stating that Kant ranked autonomy above all other values);
see also IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 9
(Lewis White Beck trans., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1959) (1785) (discussing
the supreme importance of an individual's good will).
38. See Dorff, supra note 20, at 860-61.
39. The symmetric case is where all actors are similarly situated-e.g., all
are equally likely to be victims and tortfeasors in the tort context. FAIRNESS,
supra note 1, at 52.
40. See id. at 57-58.
41. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971).
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original position approach. They would find the symmetric
cases in the book contrived, unrealistic, and unpersuasive.12 If

you don't buy into the premise that such situations provide
good guidance on the rules of ethics, the rest of Kaplow and
Shavell's argument is of little consequence.
As for those who do buy into something like the original
position approach, the key issue is what those in the original
position would choose to maximize. Kaplow and Shavell simply
assume that it is welfare. Rawls argues, at some length, that it
is what he calls primary goods.43 Sen has an entire book arguing that it is what he calls capabilities.44 In a footnote, Kaplow
and Shavell recognize that Rawls and Sen disagree with them
on this essential point, but then dismiss the disagreement in a
simple paragraph arguing that weighting goods differently
from how individuals actually weight them will sometimes
make those individuals worse off.45 They ignore Sen's arguments as to why various notions of well-being deal inadequately with how material deprivation can shape a person's
preferences.46 They also ignore a major motivation for Rawls's
use of an index of primary goods: An index provides an objective measure on which all can agree in deciding basic social
structures.4 7 By contrast, direct measures of well-being that allow interpersonal comparisons of well-being are notoriously difficult to construct-very likely impossible in practice, even if
not theoretically impossible, as some economists have maintained. 4s Kaplow and Shavell blithely dismiss this problem in a
footnote.49
More generally, Kaplow and Shavell assume an almost unbreakable link between what individuals prefer and what is
good for them, their welfare.50 There is a huge body of literature
42. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism,
Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1192 (1992);
Michael D. Weiss, A Jurisprudence of Blindness: Rawls' Justice and Legal
Theory, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 565, 582-87 (1993).
43. See RAWLS, supra note 41, at 90-95.
44. See SEN, COMMODITIES, supra note 8.
45. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 29-30 n.27.
46. See SEN, COMMODITIES, supra note 8, at 29-30.
47. See RAWLS, supra note 41, at 95.
48. See, e.g., Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 48
ECON. J. 635, 637, 640-41 (1938).

49. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 24 n.15.
50. Id. at 23. The "almost" refers to Kaplow and Shavell's caveat that individuals may sometimes lack the knowledge to understand how situations
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discussing that link between preferences and welfare,"' but
Kaplow and Shavell barely even address it, except for conceding that welfare should be defined in terms of individuals' pref52
erences given adequate knowledge about alternative states.
You caught that recent series of Dilbert cartoons, right, Adam?
Dilbert was taking a mind-altering drug that made him happy
despite a variety of side effects such as the growth of an exoskeleton. Here, let me show you; I keep a copy in my wallet:
THE PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS MAKE ME

HAPPY BUT I JORRY
THAT IT'S NOT GENUINE HAPPINESS.

DILBERT

8
ASK YOUR DOCTOR
THAT

FOR A DRUG
CURES JORRYING.
THEN YOU'LL HAVE

IT MIGHT MAKE YOU
GROW
YOU WON'T
BUTEXOSKELETON, AN
CARE.

reprinted by permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

Did Dilbert's drug-induced choices really improve his welfare?
Scott Adams suggests the answer is no, and who am I to argue
with Scott Adams?
Kaplow and Shavell's failure to adequately explore what
constitutes "welfare" really matters. Rawls is the leading political theorist of our age and a leading advocate of fairness. Sen is
one of the leading welfare economists alive and a Nobel laureate. He has thought as deeply about these questions as anyone
I know. If Kaplow and Shavell are to succeed, they must take
on these thinkers. Yet they barely even attempt to refute either
Rawls or Sen, much less engage the general literature on the
connection between preferences and welfare. It can't be that
they just did not have enough time or space to confront their
strongest opponents on this crucial point; they are willing to
engage at length with much lesser lights on much lesser points.
For instance, they go on for fourteen pages on the alleged inadequacies of the literature advocating a retributive theory of
affect their well-being. Id.
51. See Farber, supra note 25, at 7-15 (overviewing the literature on the
topic of preferences versus welfare through an analysis of the Pareto principle); see also Dolinko, supra note 20, at 364-84 (discussing preferences whose
satisfaction harms the individual, adaptive preference, and the coherence of
the concept of preference satisfaction).
52.

See FAIRNESS, supra-note 1, at 410-13.
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punishment.5 3 I strongly suspect that they give Rawls and Sen
a miss because they just don't have any good responses to
them.
ADAM: I think you are being a little unfair...
MAX:
Maybe, but am I advancing well-being?
ADAM: Yeah, yeah, I think you are being a little unfair,
although it would be interesting to read more about what Kaplow and Shavell have to say about Rawls on primary goods and
Sen on capabilities. Actually, in a recent manuscript Kaplow
engages this debate.54 The first part of his paper presents a formal version of the argument that approaches such as those
taken by Rawls and Sen will in some circumstances make
ev-eryone worse off.5u The second part addresses arguments in
favor of non-welfarist approaches. Kaplow thinks that Rawls's
point has some merit but characterizes it as a merely "instrumental" criticism that only focuses on how to measure wellbeing, not whether well-being is the correct "normative ideal."57
MAX:
I find it odd for an economist to criticize a position
as merely instrumental. Economics is instrumental down to its
core. If for deep systematic reasons we cannot devise a measure
for making interpersonal comparisons of well-being, then what
purpose does the concept of well-being serve? How can an allegedly scientific theory be grounded on maximizing well-being
if we can never actually tell when we have succeeded? I also
think that Sen's critique of welfare economics goes normatively
deeper than Rawls's.
ADAM: Kaplow also has an answer to Sen in that recent
paper. Kaplow denies that we should be suspicious of preferences that have adapted to deprivation. 5 As an example, he
uses a choice between providing medicine to two people, one
with a minor illness and the other with a serious illness that
would normally cause substantial pain, but due to a neurological process the second person is numb to the pain.55 Kaplow argues that we should not ignore this numbness; the medicine

53. Id. at 303-17.
54. See Louis Kaplow, Primary Goods, Capabilities,.., or Well-Being?
1-23 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
55. Id. at 4-14.
56. Id. at 14-22.
57. Id. at 16-17.
58. See id. at 18-20.
59. Id. at 19.
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should go to the person with the lesser illness." In general, we
should not let objective indicators trump subjective perceptions
of well-being.6
MAX:
I agree with the outcome of the hypothetical, but
the choice of hypothetical shows me that Kaplow has an inadequate understanding of well-being. He seems to equate wellbeing simply with increasing pleasure and decreasing pain as
subjectively experienced by the individual. Thus, Kaplow's response commits him to saying that Dilbert really is better off
with his drug, exoskeleton and all. Thoughtful utilitarians have
been trying to move
away from that sort of position ever since
62
John Stuart Mill.
Moreover, I think Kaplow and Shavell will find it very hard
to square this position with their concession that uninformed
choices do not necessarily count.63 The line between preferences
based on deprivation and choices based on bad information is
blurred at best. Consider the following cases:
" buying a CD and getting a different artist than that
on the label;
* buying a CD not knowing about subliminal messages that will induce the listener to buy a certain
product;
" buying a CD when drunk, having fallen for a song
that when sober one would abhor;
* buying a CD after having been forced against one's
will to listen to a song while sleeping, resulting in
musical addiction;
* buying a CD after getting hooked on a song because
of repeatedly listening to it on a Clear Channel radio station;
* buying a CD of a particular type of music that one
might recognize as quite shallow and uninteresting
if one had the benefits of a better musical education.
Now, the situations are obviously different, and there are
very good legal and policy reasons for treating them differently.

60. Id.
61. See id. at 18-20.
62. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863); see also J.J.C. SMART &
BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 12-27 (1973) (discussing whether well-being should be measured subjectively).
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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If you think about this list, however, then you'll see that the
line between questioning a decision because it was made based
on mistaken information or because it was made based on suspect preferences is more provisional and harder to draw than
Kaplow and Shavell's framework suggests. Preferences are not
given, as economists assume; they develop over time based on
one's information and experience.64 If one's information and experience are systematically distorted, then one's preferences
will likely be distorted as well. In the wrong hands this can
lead to dangerously paternalistic prescriptions, but that's not
reason enough to refuse to confront the issue altogether. 5
ADAM: I want to move on to another argument that Kaplow and Shavell make to support their position: logical consistency. 66 Suppose that you buy at least some of their examples
and think that in those cases we must follow Pareto efficiency
and welfare economics over fairness. Admitting that fairness
theories are sometimes wrong shows that the theory is logically
unacceptable. As Kaplow and Shavell put it, "demonstrating
that a theory, in some part of its intended domain of application, contradicts a principle to which one subscribes, shows the
theory to be unacceptable." 7 Thus, one cannot brush off their
examples as simply odd cases of little concern. Fairness advocates must refute the examples or admit that anyone committed to logical consistency must reject their theories.
MAX:
This point is not very compelling, and once again I
don't think it's an argument in favor of welfare over fairness.
First off, I don't think that too many people are really committed to logical consistency in moral and political theory. Some
philosophers say they are, but precious few will really stick to
that commitment in a pinch. For instance, when confronted
with intuitively troubling examples that clearly flow from basic
utilitarian premises, most utilitarians will perform all sorts of
theoretical hocus-pocus to sidestep the conclusions that their
theory seems to suggest. 8 Moreover, their idea of consistency
isn't quite logical consistency anyway. Without engaging in a
mistake of logic, one can quite logically be willing to apply a
64. See Dolinko, supra note 20, at 374-75 (citing references).
65. Dolinko thinks that the problems of erroneous or adaptive preferences
call into question the very intelligibility of Kaplow and Shavell's notion of
well-being. See id. at 368-78.
66. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 56.
67. Id.
68. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
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theory in one domain of application but not in another, where it
has been shown to produce undesirable results. The oddness
and underexplained nature of their notion of consistency makes
it less attractive.
Second, the consistency argument doesn't support their position if you do not agree with Kaplow and Shavell's initial assumption that Pareto is the optimal criterion. That is, if given a
choice between the Pareto principle and fairness, you choose
fairness, then their notion of consistency commits you to rejecting the Pareto principle overall. We have already seen that
they really don't have any arguments compelling agreement
with them on that basic choice; with fingers crossed, they just
hope people will intuitively choose Pareto when presented with
fairness as a competing alternative. The idea of consistency
adds nothing to support their initial claims.
Third, logical consistency is a two-edged sword. Kaplow
and Shavell don't dwell on it, or pay much attention to it at all,
but there are plenty of examples in the literature (for instance,
sadists, or organ harvesters who kill innocent people to save
the lives of many other people) where advocates of utilitarianism, and often welfarism more generally, are hard put to defend the answers that their system seems to give.39
ADAM: Actually, in a recent paper Kaplow and Shavell
acknowledge that point. ° They admit that utilitarianism, and
welfarism more generally, must be able to answer such attacks,
or else logical consistency would demand rejecting those approaches as well. 71 They suggest, though, that their argument
against fairness, especially in the symmetric setting, goes more
to the core of fairness principles than do most arguments-bycounterexample directed against utilitarianism and welfarism.72

MAX:
I congratulate them on acknowledging the point.
In that paper, however, they have few answers to any of the
standard attacks on utilitarianism. One standard attack that
they do discuss at some length in the book is objectionable pref69. See, e.g., CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Samuel Scheffler ed.,
1988); SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 62.
70. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, ALL INDIVIDUALS MAY BE
MADE WORSE OFF UNDER ANY NONWELFARIST PRINCIPLE 11-12 (John M.

Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 350,
2002), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=304385 (last visited Aug. 28, 2003).
71. See id.
72. See id. at 11 n.26.
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erences.73 They grant that there are some troubling instances
where it seems intuitively wrong to give positive weight to the
preferences of some people, such as bigots and sadists, even
though they may genuinely derive pleasure from the pain and
hardship of others. 4 Nevertheless, they try to defend welfarism
in such cases by arguing that it is difficult to know when we
should ignore objectionable preferences and when not."5 Fair
enough, but that really does not deal with those cases where
preferences are clearly objectionable. They accuse the literature
on objectionable preferences of not providing a "general affirmative justification" for ignoring such preferences. 6 In light
of our conversation today, that is really the pot calling the kettle black.
Kaplow and Shavell also claim that objectionable preferences
will
them
" rarely
77 triumph in a welfarist calculation that gives
them weight. This may be so, but "rarely" is not "never," and if
we find the welfarist conclusion on those occasions unacceptable, then the logical consistency point kicks in, and Kaplow
and Shavell's own logic demands that we reject welfarism altogether.
ADAM: That would be a very weak basis for rejecting an
entire approach to justifying public policy-the sadist examples
are unusual cases where our intuitions may be misleading. As I
mentioned earlier, Kaplow and Shavell's examples against
fairness go more to the core than do the examples against utilitarianism. 6
MAX:
Maybe, but maybe not. Kaplow and Shavell's
entire "argument" against fairness has the same weak structure: They come up with unrealistic examples well removed
from real life and then trust that our intuitive reaction to those
examples will carry us along to their preferred conclusion."
Moreover, I'm not convinced that the objectionable preference
counterexamples are that far removed from the core of welfarism. Welfarists, especially Kaplow and Shavell, generally take
it as obvious that we should take the satisfaction of people's

73. FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 418-31.
74. Id. at 418-19.
75. See id. at 421-26.
76. Id. at 426.
77. See id. at 427-28.
78. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
79. See Dolinko, supra note 20, at 386.
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preferences as a good thing.0 But why should we? Is the satisfaction of any preference really a good thing for society? When a
sadist gets pleasure from torturing someone, it is clear to me
that the sadist's pleasure does not make society better off in
any way that should be recognized as valid, even putting aside
the harm to the victim and the horror others may feel. The
objectionable preference cases illustrate that the attractiveness
of satisfying any and all preferences must be argued for, not
simply assumed. Yet Kaplow and Shavell have no argument.
They see the desirability of satisfying preferences as intuitively
obvious, with no need to argue in its favor.8 ' As I noted earlier,
there is quite a bit of scholarship attacking this assumption
82

it.
that is so central to their position, but they ignore

Indeed, I am rather puzzled by Kaplow and Shavell's general attitude toward intuitions. Much of the time, as in the section on objectionable preferences, they are skeptical about
intuitions. They say we should not accept intuitions uncritically
and mention a variety of flaws in everyday psychology that may
make our intuitions misleading in some circumstances.8 3 They
also trot out a functionalist explanation of intuitions as working to advance social welfare, although in atypical cases intuitions may fail to do so.84 This suggests we should trust reason

rather than intuitions when we engage in moral theory and policy making.
Yet, in the end, Kaplow and Shavell's entire argument is
based on nothing more than intuition. They present examples
where fairness leads to Pareto inefficiency and expect our intuitions to side with Pareto over fairness.8 How can we tell when
we should trust our intuitions and when not?
ADAM: We should trust them when they point to welfarist
conclusions, of course. Anyway, I find Kaplow and Shavell especially persuasive when they are shooting down a variety of
bad arguments made by many fairness advocates. I finished the
book relatively convinced by their argument that fairness advocates have failed to come up with good arguments to support
their position. Fairness advocates must explain why it is sometimes best to make people worse off. Why should we ask society
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See
See
See
See
See

supra note 50 and accompanying text.
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 72 n.108.
id. at 64-69; infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.

85.

See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 420 n.49.
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to sacrifice without being given a good reason why?86
MAX:
It is often easier to shoot down bad arguments by
your opponents than it is to come up with constructive arguments in favor of your position, as Kaplow and Shavell are well
aware. Nonetheless, I agree that they score some decent points
against certain fairness advocates, and we shall discuss some of
those points soon enough. But here, too, Kaplow and Shavell
fail to produce a real argument.
First off, they generally ignore most of the real heavyweights opposed to them. I already mentioned Rawls and Sen,87
most of whose core arguments they do not confront. Rawls, in
particular, has a few arguments as to why society should follow
his notion of fairness. Those arguments constitute A Theory of
Justice, the leading political theory work of our time.88 Just to
pick out a few others at random, there is Nozick and his rightsbased libertarian theory8 9 or Walzer 9° and Sande 91 with their
communitarian approaches. Kaplow and Shavell largely focus
on legal scholars, which I suppose makes sense given the institutional context for their book's genesis. Given the scope of
their claims, however, Kaplow and Shavell must move beyond
the law reviews and take on their serious foes. For the most
part, they haven't.
Furthermore, even if we agree that fairness advocates lack
positive arguments for their positions, where does that leave
us? Why is the burden of proof on them to justify their position?
Given Kaplow and Shavell's lack of affirmative justification for
their position, where the burden of proof lies is crucial. Yet they
provide no good reason why the burden should be on their
opponents. Once again they seem to fall back on the intuitive
obviousness of the value of satisfying preferences. They assert
that given the conflict between welfare and fairness, and the
alleged obvious appeal of welfare, the burden of proof is on
fairness advocates.92 This is not an argument for their posi86. Id. at 59-60.
87. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
88. See RAWLS, supra note 41.
89. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Kaplow
and Shavell cite Nozick a few times on the subject of criminal punishment, but
never really grapple with him. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 312 n.40, 314
n.46, 365 n.153.
90. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
91. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982).
92. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 59, 468-69 (arguing that reliance on
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tion-it is a mere assertion of that position; it is a claim without a warrant. If you don't start out preferring welfare over
fairness, then there is no reason at all to accept their allocation
of the burden of proof.
ADAM: But Kaplow and Shavell rightly argue that many
fairness advocates simply assume the correctness and obviousness of their position.93 Given the demonstrated inconsistency
of fairness theories and a clearly attractive and minimalist alternative such as Pareto efficiency, isn't it incumbent upon
fairness advocates to produce positive arguments for their position, rather than merely assuming and asserting its correctness?
MAX:
Once again, kettle meet pot; pot, kettle. That's all
Kaplow and Shavell do-merely assume and assert the obviousness of their position, and in particular of Pareto efficiency.
Unless they offer more in the way of arguments and reasons,
we seem to have reached a stalemate.
ADAM: I don't think that Kaplow and Shavell are completely empty and circular at this point. Given a face-off
between competing intuitions favoring Pareto efficiency and
fairness, one effective strategy is to explain away the appeal of
one set of intuitions. Kaplow and Shavell spend quite a bit of
time and effort successfully combating intuitions favoring fairness. 94 If they are right, then one should ignore those intuitions
in cases where they conflict with efficiency.
Fairness intuitions generally are manifestations of widely
accepted social norms. Kaplow and Shavell argue that the leading evolutionary and functional explanations suggest that social norms arise because welfare is ordinarily advanced when
people follow them. 95 For instance, commercial transactions will
work better if participants trust one another because they adhere to promise-keeping norms. 6 Similarly, fewer torts will occur if people believe that they should be aware of the effects
their actions have on others, and believe that if they aren't
aware, and injure another, they should be punished. 9

notions of fairness may result in legal policy inferior to that which might be
chosen if welfare economics played a larger role).
93. Id. at 59.
94. See id. at 62-81.
95. Id. at 71.
96. See id. at 204-06.
97. See id. at 135-36.
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These norms help reduce overly selfish behavior. 98 They
also provide useful guides to correct behavior, freeing people
from the burden of trying to think through what to do in every
new situation.9 9 That is, social norms are good proxies or rules
of thumb. To succeed in those two uses, though, norms must
generally be quite simple and broad."'
The simplicity of social norms is their weakness when it
comes to formal policy analysis. Norms need to be simple,
broad, unchanging, and easily understood.'' Policy analysts,
however, often think about policies that have myriad effects on
multiple people in complex modern societies. Moreover, new
technological and sociological facts may make old norms perform poorly in new situations. If the original point of norms is
to advance efficiency, but a more sophisticated analysis shows
that in a certain situation traditional norms no longer promote
efficiency, then surely it makes sense to ignore those norms and
instead look to what promotes efficiency and advances social
welfare.0 2
MAX:
I grant that this is a real argument against fairness intuitions, although not one in favor of welfarist intuitions. However, I don't think it's a very strong argument. Moreover, it makes me wonder whether engaging in welfarist policy
analysis makes sense even from a welfarist perspective.
First off, the evolutionary and functionalist explanations of
norms as advancing welfare may not be the best explanations
for many norms. Some norms may be ideological props to defend the position of the powerful against the weak. More generally, norms may advance the interests of a subgroup but hurt
society as a whole. Honor among thieves, for instance, is usually not a good thing for those of us who are not thieves. For
an example closer to home, many of the ethical rules governing
lawyers may serve to restrict entry into the profession, and
hence raise legal salaries, rather than help our clients or society. If norms are not really there to advance social welfare,
then the argument for ignoring norms when policy analysis
shows them to conflict with welfare falls apart.
ADAM: Perhaps. Some norms probably are not best
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 68-69.
See id. at 66, 69.
See id.
See id. at 73-77.
See id. at 64 n.92.
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explained as welfare enhancing in origin, but I think that many
probably are welfare enhancing in effect. To really nail this
point, one would need to engage in a broad, wide-ranging social
science analysis of the origins of social norms, which you have
not done.
MAX:
Indeed I have not. Neither, of course, have you or
Kaplow and Shavell.
I wonder whether one could run this argument in reverse.
That is, might it be that norms and intuitions favoring Pareto
efficiency naturally tend to arise in people because in most instances Pareto efficiency tends to advance fairness? In a society
where a basic principle of fairness has structured the underlying institutions, people may naturally come to care about the
welfare of others because well-functioning institutions bring
them into helpful interactions with others. Pareto efficiency,
then, may be a good proxy for advancing fairness. If so, when
the two conflict, isn't it fairness, not efficiency, that we should
follow?
ADAM: That strikes me as more clever than convincing,
and really not all that clever. Kaplow and Shavell's argument
has weight because it draws on a longstanding tradition of evolutionary and functionalist explanations of social norms. That
tradition may not always be right, but it is well developed.
Your argument-in-reverse is just out there on its own.
MAX:
I concede that it's not my best argument, but it's at
least interesting.
ADAM: I hear that "interesting" is not a term of praise
back at your home in Minnesota.
MAX:
Another problem with Kaplow and Shavell's functionalist critique is that even if advancing welfare explains the
origin of many norms, it does not necessarily give us a reason
to continue following those norms. For instance, the urge to
protect children in one's care can be explained as an evolutionary adaptation that enhanced the chances of passing on one's
genes, since children in one's care will typically be one's biological offspring. Does that mean that we have no reason to indulge
that urge and take care of adopted children as if they were our
own? Not at all-taking good care of children under one's protection is the right thing to do for reasons beyond the biological
circumstances giving rise to the instinct.
ADAM: Taking good care of children in one's care presumably advances efficiency even if they are not one's biological
offspring.
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MAX:
Yes, but that misses the logic of my point-the biological urge probably comes only from the benefits to one's offspring, not society more broadly. Yet that urge has given rise to
values that we believe people should affirm and follow even
outside the context in which it evolved. Evolutionary origins
may certainly be of interest in understanding the appeal of
many norms, but they aren't the only reason we have to follow
those norms.104
Anyway, my biggest problem with Kaplow and Shavell's
fairness-norms-as-welfare-enhancing line of argument is that,
by its own standard, the argument proves that welfarist policy
analysis does not advance welfare. On Kaplow and Shavell's
own showing, fairness norms are usually adequate policy and
behavior guides. °5 They fail to give the right answers in a relatively limited class of circumstances, especially as complex
modern society becomes more removed from the simpler times
when such fairness norms formed. 10 6 For welfarist analysis to
be worthwhile, on welfarist grounds, its expected gains should
outweigh its expected costs--otherwise, engaging in the analysis would be inefficient. But how great are the expectecKbenefits
from employing a welfare analysis, as opposed to simply relying
on conventional fairness norms and the fairness theories that
arise from them? According to Kaplow and Shavell, the benefit
lies in the increased welfare that results from better policy.
They say that sometimes-simplistic norms produce answers
that hurt rather than enhance welfare, while a welfare-based
policy analysis is more sophisticated and empirically grounded,
leading to welfare gains where norms give the wrong answer.107
But how often will policy analysis be sufficiently strong,
clear, and unambiguous to actually lead to a different result
than norms? Consider the many obstacles. First, one must engage in a positive analysis of different policy alternatives, including the likelihood and magnitude of each policy's impacts. I
am too inexperienced in other social sciences to speak about
them, but if that policy analysis is grounded in economics, as

104. For a good, brief discussion of the relationship between evolutionary
selection and what he calls "reflective selection," see Amartya Sen, Foreword
to ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION, at vii, ix-xi (Avner Ben-Ner &

Louis Putterman eds., 1998). For a longer discussion that strongly criticizes
Kaplow and Shavell, see Coleman, supra note 20, at 1529-37.
105.

See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 62-69.

106.

See id. at 73-77.

107.

See id.
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Kaplow and Shavell clearly contemplate and conform to in
other writings, then the whole project is pretty well doomed
right from the start. Economists are notorious for having arguments on both sides of any issue. Harry Truman didn't plead
for a one-handed economist for nothing. Economic theory almost always suggests a variety of effects pointing in different
directions, making it necessary to estimate empirically the size
and probability of the different effects. Yet empirical economics
is chronically underdeveloped and underpersuasive. This is certainly true in the field of law and economics. The end result is
that analysts on each side of a policy split can almost always
marshal equally balanced economic arguments to support their
preferred position.0 8 And, I assure you, there are more than
two sides to most policy splits.
ADAM: That seems like a rather overly negative view of
positive economic analysis. Fine, economics is rarely, if ever,
conclusive, but surely we can say that sometimes, maybe even
often, one side of a debate has stronger, more convincing arguments than the other. Economists can never be certain, but
they can have a pretty good idea that some effects are more
likely than others.'09
MAX:
I disagree. I'm not trying to be nihilistic, either. I
agree that in many cases some empirical predictions will be
more plausible than others. What I deny is that economists are
frequently, or ever, able to achieve consensus on predictions in
cases where significant social conflict exists-that is, in the
cases that actually matter for legal and public policy analysis.
Legal and social conflict is most likely to exist precisely in those
cases where empirical arguments are complicated and uncertain-if the empirical effects were clear-cut, serious conflict
would be unlikely. Even Kaplow and Shavell say that welfare
analysis matters most where complex modern society has
moved beyond the simpler circumstances in which fairness
norms evolved. 10 But the very complexity of such situations
makes empirical analysis more ambiguous.

108. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, The Politics of Political Economists, in
ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMICS 51, 63 (1965) ("The apparatus of eco-

nomics is very flexible: without breaking the rules of the profession ...a sufficiently clever person can reach any conclusion he wishes on any real problem
.... In general there is no position.., which cannot be reached by a competent use of respectable economic theory.").
109. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 458.
110. See id. at 73-77.
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Let me distinguish social scientists from natural scientists.
The latter have developed empirical methods strong enough to
at least sometimes be able to decide live conflicts. The former
have failed to do so. Can you point me to any interesting policy
argument that has really been resolved by positive economic
analysis, or any other sort of social science? To decide this point
one would have to go through the whole literature of economics,
or social science more generally, which is obviously way beyond
our scope here. I'm not optimistic about the result, though.
ADAM: How about international trade and the theory of
comparative advantage as an area where the vast majority of
economists agree?"'
I don't think even comparative advantage does the
MAX:
trick. Virtually all economists agree on the theory, but there
are countervailing arguments. Recent theories of regional advantages due to increasing returns to scale suggest that under
some circumstances some degree of protectionism may make
sense as a way of promoting infant industries. 2 There is now a
messy empirical debate as to the relative importance of these
two theories of international trade and the implications for
trade policy."'
ADAM: Kaplow and Shavell recognize the problem of empirical uncertainty. They suggest, though, that as more legal
scholars recognize the need for empirical analysis, more of it
will be forthcoming, and we will gradually build a better body
of positive work in which to ground our normative analyses."'
Their faith is touching, but misplaced. Only time
MAX:
will truly tell, but modern economics has already had several
decades to get its empirical act together, so far to very little
avail. Even law and economics has had at least three decades of
many researchers plugging away at its agenda, with astonishingly little empirical work of any real value to date.' Expecting economists to mend their ways is a lot like hopeful but foolish brides who marry expecting to be able to reform their new
111.

PAUL KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS 128 (The

MIT Press 1994) (1990) ("[Clomparative advantage is one of the few ideas in
economics that is true without being obvious." (citing Paul Samuelson)).
112. See Douglas Clement, Trading Places: Why Do Nations Trade and
Where Do Industries Locate? A Recent Fed Paper Considers Recent Theories,
REGION, Dec. 2002, at 11.
113. See id. at 11-12.
114. FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 458.
115. See Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L.
REv. 807, 810-12 (1999).
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husbands. Indeed, if you want good empirical data, you're far
better off talking to sociologists 116-in

legal academia, that

would mean dealing with "law and society" scholars. I don't
recommend talking to a sociologist for too long, though-it may
lead to a proliferation of two-by-two tables.
Even if a helpful positive analysis of the effects of competing policies is available, welfare analysts must also conduct a
normative analysis of those likely outcomes. Here, the prospects for economic analysis are even more dire. As Kaplow and
Shavell seem to admit,1 7 on its own, Pareto efficiency is rarely
a strong enough criterion to provide an answer to most
interesting problems because such problems involve tradeoffsany given policy will help some people but hurt others. One
must sort through the distributive effects of each policy to determine which policy enhances welfare the most. In terms of
the welfare economics framework, one must choose among social welfare functions. Alas, welfare economics has given us
very little help in making that choice. As several critics of
Kaplow and Shavell have already observed," 8 which social
welfare function you follow will usually have a decisive impact
as to what policy you advocate. Yet Kaplow and Shavell really
tell us nothing about how to choose among social welfare
functions. I strongly suspect that one's underlying visions of
fairness will strongly influence how this choice is made."19 If so,
then it remains quite unclear whether welfarist policy analysis
has added anything at all to what we would get simply by considering fairness norms.
ADAM: Yes, that's a problem, but Kaplow and Shavell provide a partial answer. To get the right distribution of income or
wealth in society we should focus on tax and transfer policy. In
other areas of policy, we should focus solely on efficiency, here
understood as Kaldor-Hicks rather than Pareto efficiency.

the

effects

of efficient

policy

are

troubling

in

20

If

terms

116. See Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 627 (1986).
117. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 56.
118. See Dorff, supra note 20, at 897-98; Daniel Farber, What (If Anything)
Can Economics Say About Equity?, 102 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003)
(manuscript at 3, on file with author).
119. See Dorff, supra note 20, at 898; Farber, supra note 118, at 3.
120. A choice is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if it is potentially Pareto efficient;
that is, if it would be possible to compensate everyone made worse off by the
move so that they were not worse off, while some persons remained better off.
See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 43-44 (3d ed.
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of distribution, they can be corrected through a progressive income tax.12 ' Tax policy is the most efficient way to redistribute
income-Kaplow and Shavell have argued this in a series of
papers over the years, and the argument has come to be widely
accepted by law and economics scholars.12 2 Thus, any indeterminacy caused by redistributive concerns can be confined
largely to tax policy.
MAX:
That's not a bad answer, but I have several problems with it. First, the remaining indeterminacy in the area of
tax policy may be severe and important. Second, focusing on
achieving Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in other areas may be quite
indeterminate, both because of the difficulties of positive analysis and because measuring Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in practice
is not easy. Third, we may care about inequalities in areas
other than income or wealth or characteristics closely tied to
income or wealth. For instance, we may care about equal opportunity and access to education, or about access to 12
political
3
power. Tax policy does little to address such inequality.
Moreover, in a series of articles Chris Sanchirico has applied the theory of the second best to show that Kaplow and
Shavell's argument on the use of tax policy is dubious.1 24 Tax
policy itself is an imperfect way of redistributing income and
wealth-it has serious distortionary effects. In general, when a
given policy instrument is imperfect, it's wise to augment it
with other instruments to help achieve one's goals. Thus, policy
areas other than taxation should be evaluated for their distributive effects.
ADAM: Yes, but Kaplow and Shavell have fought back,
2000).
121. FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 33-34.
122. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 120, at 112; Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules
and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000)
[hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Favor the Poor]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, RedistributingIncome]; Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional
Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given
Optimal Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1981).
123. Cf. Michael J. Meurer, FairDivision, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 970 n.117
(1999) (raising this objection to law and economics generally).
124. See Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001) [hereinafter Sanchirico, Deconstructing); Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for
Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).
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showing that Sanchirico's
point is theoretically valid but em125
pirically unimportant.

MAX:
They have not "shown" any such thing-again,
they have merely asserted it. That debate is still quite open,
and I suspect it will remain so indefinitely-once one gets ensnared in empirical debates within the framework of the theory
of the second best, there is very little chance of emerging alive.
For what it's worth, my impression of the state of that debate is
that Sanchirico has convincingly out-argued Kaplow and Shavell thus far.126
ADAM: Imagine my shock as to which side you favor.
MAX:
My fifth and final problem with the tax policy response to the indeterminacy of social welfare functions is its
disregard of political constraints on public policy. Kaplow and
Shavell simply assume that once we decide what distribution is
best, implementing that solution through tax policy will be
politically feasible. This is not necessarily true. Tax policy is
notoriously subject to all sorts of political pressures and special
interest groups. The wealthy may have both the will and the
way to stave off redistributive taxes.'27 Of course, that is true in
other policy areas as well. For a variety of reasons, however, it
may be that redistributive policies are politically easier to
achieve in non-tax policy areas. For instance, judges may be
able to pursue distributive fairness policies when legislators
cannot and may be able to employ their discretion to redistribute better in areas other than tax law. Moreover, action in
some policy areas can affect the political balance of power and
hence what is politically achievable in other areas. For instance, a strong antitrust policy may limit the size and power of
large corporations and their managers, thereby making other
sorts of political reforms more possible. Thus, a strong antitrust
policy may be desirable even if it has negative efficiency effects
in the immediate markets and industries to which it is applied. 128
125. See Kaplow & Shavell, Favor the Poor,supra note 122, at 833.
126. See Sanchirico, Deconstructing,supra note 124, at 1071-80.
127. Kaplow and Shavell recognize this is a potential problem, and put it
aside as beyond the scope of their article, which is fair enough. See Kaplow &
Shavell, Redistributing Income, supra note 122, at 675 (recognizing that the
political balance of power can cause a tax system to fall short of optimum redistributive taxation).
128. See Brett H. McDonnell & Daniel A. Farber, Are Efficient Antitrust
Rules Always Optimal?, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript
at 4-6, on file with author).
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At any rate, let us assume that economic analysis has
given us an adequately clear prediction of the consequences of
different policies, and that welfare analysis has provided an
adequately clear answer as to the best policy given those
effects. Hey, it could happen. But even then, there is a final
hurdle before the whole analysis has proven its use. The analysis must actually be implemented as public policy; it must be
politically viable. If it is significantly at odds with fairness
norms, is this at all likely to happen? Given the strength of
fairness norms, and the complication of welfare analysis, the
welfare analyst is not likely to succeed politically.
ADAM: Again, Kaplow and Shavell anticipate your concern. They spend some time discussing the problems that governmental officials face when policy analysis conflicts with
fairness norms. They acknowledge that sometimes policy makers will not be able to follow the welfare analysis. However,
they think that often officials will either be able to adequately
educate the citizenry or find other ways to enact the best policy. 129 Even if not, doesn't the analyst have a duty to publicly
advocate the best policy, even if it is doomed to be ignored?
MAX:
The lonely analyst crying out in the wilderness is
all very romantic, but of little help in proving the usefulness of
welfare policy analysis. As to the rest of your answer, I doubt
that welfare analysis will be able to win out over fairness
norms unless either the welfare analysis is not that different
from the fairness norms, in which case not much has been
gained, or the policy matter is so obscure and technical that the
public doesn't really care. It will happen occasionally, but not
very often.
Thus, welfare analysis has three very great hurdles to leap
if it is to realize its benefits. Positive analysis must be definite
enough to predict the consequences of different policies, both in
terms of probability and magnitude of impact; normative
analysis must give a way to choose among the alternatives
given those consequences; and finally, the resulting policy recommendation must be politically feasible. Most of the time, any
of these hurdles alone will be enough to make welfare analysis
inconsequential. Together, they suggest that welfare analysis
rarely will provide any tangible benefits.
ADAM: As I have suggested, I think one can disagree with
your reasoning at every step of the way and wind up agreeing
129. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 396-402.
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with Kaplow and Shavell that welfare analysis offers at least a
modest prospect of improving policy and the promise of working
better in the future if more academics start doing things the
right way, via a welfare analysis. At any rate, as long as there
is some possible benefit, what's the harm of engaging in welfare
analysis?
That's the right question to ask, and I believe the
MAX:
cost is potentially considerable. Recall that Kaplow and Shavell
admit, even emphasize, that fairness norms are usually helpful,
and that a society is better off for having such norms. 130 The
question is, will an increasingly strong role for economics in legal policy analysis undermine such norms? There is considerable research showing that training in economics tends to make
people more selfish.'13 Actually, it's a tricky chicken-egg question: Does economics makes people selfish, or do selfish people
become economists? As best as we can tell, the answer is both.
Of course, very sophisticated economists do, to some extent, realize the value of norms and altruism. However, less sophisticated economists do not, and even the more sophisticated ones
have years of training in homo economicus engrained within
them.
ADAM: Kaplow and Shavell anticipate this objection too.
They answer by replying, first, that it remains unclear whether
economics actually tends to make people more selfish and less
cooperative.' 32 Second, they argue that even if it does, such a
is a small price to pay for the benefits from
toll on the analyst
33
better analysis.

MAX:
Those responses are underwhelming. As to the
first point, yes, the statistical evidence is not definitive-it
rarely is. But enough systematic evidence exists that anyone
who claims to take such evidence seriously should be very concerned. Kaplow and Shavell are reduced to anecdotally citing
individual famous economists who appear to behave in humanitarian ways-not very scientific of them.' As to the second
point, the problem is not the effect on the analysts. Economists
deserve what they get. The problem is their students. Some
130. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
131. See Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (1993); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 295, 306-07 (1981).
132. FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 452 n.116.
133. Id.
134. See id.
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studies have suggested a serious effect on undergraduate economics majors,"' which is a popular major today, especially
among future business leaders. One presumes the same is true
for MBA students. Now Kaplow and Shavell want law professors to be immersed in economics. What would that mean for
the education of future lawyers? Lawyers are an important part
of the business and political elite-making them more selfish
and less altruistic would be a disturbing and large cost to the
spread of economic analysis in the law. Moreover, a selfish analyst can make for selfish analysis, undermining the whole project.
ADAM: Selfish, uncooperative lawyers-hasn't that barn
door been wide open for far too long to be shut now?
MAX:
And law and economics has been influential for
decades now-there seems to be a correlation, though of course
that doesn't prove causation.
ADAM: Well, making law students selfish doesn't strike
me as a likely problem. By your own admission, in this kind of
an argument it's doubtful that we will ever get clear evidence of
the likely costs and benefits of legal welfare analysis.
MAX:
Granted, but it should disturb Kaplow and Shavell
that it is so hard to defend their entire endeavor as being cost
justified.
ADAM: I'd like to point out one more argument by Kaplow
and Shavell that I find persuasive. They repeatedly stress that
their welfare-based approach takes an ex ante perspective on
behavior. Most fairness theorists, however, approach the law
from an ex post perspective. 3 6 For instance, in thinking about
tort rules, fairness theorists often implicitly or explicitly
assume that an accident has indeed occurred, and they focus on
how the law should respond to such an accident. They ignore
how legal rules affect the likelihood that an accident would
occur in the first place.137 Thus, welfare economics typically
takes a more comprehensive stance, focusing on more of the issues that matter to society.
Kaplow and Shavell also suggest that the ex post character
of fairness theories helps explain their popularity. In thinking
about accidents, for example, the ordinary person will naturally
focus on what has happened, not on what might have happened
135.
136.
137.

See Marwell & Ames, supra note 131, at 306-09.
See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 48-51, 437-43.
See id. at 147-48.
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but didn't. While it may be natural, it is a standard type of cognitive error. 138 Analysts trying to take a rational, comprehensive look at what is best for society should avoid such cognitive
errors.
MAX:
That is a mildly useful point. I don't think it takes
Kaplow and Shavell very far, however. First of all, I don't think
that the most important fairness theorists really take an ex
post point of view. Does that characterization really apply, for
instance, to Rawls or Nozick? I don't think so. Rawls's original
position is clearly an ex ante argument, while Nozick's distinction between procedural and substantive justice makes him
quite insistently willing to accept situations whose results
strike us as unfair if no rights were violated in reaching those
results. Once again, Kaplow and Shavell take on their minor
opponents but avoid the really important ones.
Second, it's not completely obvious to me that it's always
wrong to focus on certain limited aspects of a problem, while
ignoring others. Welfare economics may be comprehensive, but
its scope is a major source of its glaring indeterminacy that we
discussed a bit earlier.
ADAM: The fact that it's hard to get definite results from
our analysis doesn't mean that we shouldn't try.1 39 You're like
the drunk who has lost his keys at night and searches under a
street light because that's where he can see.
MAX:
Under many circumstances, that strategy is probably the right one for the drunk to use.
ADAM: Another element in the book that I like is their
insistence that the welfare economics approach is more general
and varied than many legal scholars appreciate. 40 In the legal
literature, law and economics has tended to be identified with
the goal of "wealth maximization." For someone trained in economics, that is a very odd and limited understanding of how
welfare economics works. In particular, it conveys the impression that a commitment to economic analysis entails a lack of
concern for distributional issues, which is simply not true. Kaplow and Shavell perform a real service in setting the record
straight. 141
MAX:
I agree that they make an important and useful
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 148.
See id. at 458.
Id. at 384.
See id. at 35-37.
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point in distinguishing welfare economics from wealth maximization. However, they later obscure that point by employing
numerical examples that simply assign monetary values for
each outcome to every person and then summing up the values
across persons-i.e.,
by analyzing using simple wealth maximi4
zation. 1
ADAM: But they note that wealth maximization, even
though theoretically off base, is often helpful in simple, partial
equilibrium models.
MAX: Yes, but that's the only kind of model Kaplow and
Shavell ever provide in this book.
Moreover, they grant that distribution is important but
then advocate ignoring distributional concerns for most legal
questions because tax and transfer policies can fix any inequities. 4 Their desire to cling to that argument despite Sanchirico's powerful critique suggests that distributional concerns
aren't really that near and dear to their hearts.
ADAM: So, do you believe that Kaplow and Shavell are
just wrong and that welfare economic analysis has little to add
to the law? Do you think we are better off focusing on fairness
rather than welfare?
MAX:
No, I don't advocate following fairness theories to
the exclusion of welfare analysis any more than I advocate following welfare analysis to the exclusion of fairness theories.
Welfare economics has plenty of insights to add to legal scholarship. But so does fairness. For one thing, I think a legal
academy filled with a mix of advocates, not all economists, will
produce a relatively kinder, gentler breed of lawyers, limiting
my critique of the economic approach. More importantly, I just
don't get the appeal of focusing on welfare (whatever that is) to
the exclusion of all other considerations.
At the end of our discussion I still don't think that Kaplow
and Shavell have contributed any real argument in favor of
their position. Beyond that, at some deeper psychological level I
just don't feel the need to completely dominate the field of legal
analysis, as do some economists and their fellow travelers.
Richard Posner tried it twenty years ago with wealth maximization, as Kaplow and Shavell recognize. "' Posner is trying to
142.
143.
144.
145.

See, e.g., id. at 99-123.
See id. at 36-37.
See supra notes 121-22, 125 and accompanying text.
See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 35 & n.41.
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get rid of legal philosophers with a different strategy nowadays,'46 which is probably why Posner contributed a gushy
blurb to Kaplow and Shavell's book. Still, it is a little odd considering that his current attack on the futility of philosophical
argument suggests that Kaplow and Shavell-who, after all,
make an attempt at philosophical argument-are doomed to
fail. Kaplow and Shavell want to root philosophers (who aren't
welfare economists) out of the legal academy; so does Posner.
The enemy of my enemy is my friend, I guess. I'm just not so
caught up in this battle for scholarly turf. Economics is sometimes a useful tool, sometimes not. There are plenty of other
sometimes-useful tools out there. Why categorically exclude
any of them?
While I feel the intuitive appeal of the Pareto principle, I
feel the intuitive appeal of a variety of competing fairness notions as well. I doubt very much that any one intellectual system can adequately reconcile those competing intuitions, and I
don't see any great need to try to do so. Kaplow and Shavell are
prestigious enough analysts that their book will continue to
provoke a number of arguments against and for their position.
Ultimately, though, I think the arguments they put forth are
flimsy enough to make the more interesting long-run question
about this book a psychological and sociological one: Why do
economists entering the legal academy feel a periodic need to
try to shut out their competitors, especially philosophers?
ADAM: You know, sometimes when I talk with you I feel
the spirit of Critical Legal Studies reawakening, like some fell
spirit buried deep in Moria. Skepticism about our ability to say
anything definite about law, the impulse to psychoanalyze your
opponents for hidden motives-is there a bit of the crit in you?
MAX:
Let a thousand flowers bloom, to quote Mao and
thereby confirm your suspicions. The crits did make some of
these same points about law and economics early on-its indeterminacy, its burying of value judgments in neutral-seeming
language about welfare, its imperialistic tendencies. 147 After a
decade or two of decline in the crits and continued ascendance
of the law and economics type, we could use some rebalancing.
146. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY (1999).
147. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-50
(1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

MOVEMENT 12-14 (1986); Arthur Allen Left, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
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But I say that only in the name of balance-if Leff and Unger
wrote a similar book trying to claim the entire legal field for
their own approach, I'd use law and economics arguments,
among others, to take them down a peg or two. For now,
though, it's the economists who are overreaching. And for the
record, I'm not a crit; I'm a pragmatist.
ADAM: Whatever that means; you're at Minnesota, so it
comes as no surprise. I still feel that Kaplow and Shavell at
least pose an important question for non-welfarist theories:
How can you justify sometimes making everyone worse off?
Maybe in the end they have no real logical argument beyond
that, but I think the question is still an important and damaging one. They have shifted the terms of the debate in their
favor.
MAX:
So underneath all their rhetoric about science and
logic lies only rhetoric? I can agree with that. But once people
realize this, and that the entirety of their long-sustained socalled argument is nothing more than repeating one rhetorical
question over and over (and over) again, won't that rhetoric lose
much of its force? So I hope, at any rate.
ADAM: Well, it's getting late, and I must be going. As always, it has been a pleasure talking with you. I hope we can
continue the conversation in the near future.
MAX: As long as economists keep on producing work like
this, I'm sure we will have plenty to talk about.

